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1 Introduction
The case-based decision theory has been proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) as an al-
ternative theory for decision making under uncertainty. Differently from the expected utility
theory, it models decisions in situations of structural ignorance, in which neither states of the
world, nor their probabilities can be naturally derived from the description of the problem. It is
assumed that a decision maker can only learn from experience, by evaluating an act based on its
past performance in similar circumstances. An aspiration level is used as a bench-mark in the
evaluation process. It distinguishes results considered satisfactory, i.e. those exceeding the as-
piration level, which make an act more attractive, from the unsatisfactory ones, which influence
negatively the evaluation of an act.
Since the works of Arrow (1970, p. 98), it has been assumed that the expected utility frame-
work naturally fits the description of an asset in terms of a probability distribution over state-
contingent outcomes. However, a thorough consideration of this framework shows that the
problem of formulating states of nature in the context of financial market might have no natural
solution. Indeed, besides the problem of deciding, which payoffs of a security should be con-
sidered possible, the question of correlation among the payoffs of different assets arises. Hence,
it is not a solution of the problem to identify the states of the world with the payoffs an asset
renders2.
Moreover, in a market environment payoffs are determined by capital gains, hence by equilib-
rium prices, which themselves depend on the expectations of the market participants. The well
known beauty contest used by Keynes (1936) to describe the expectation formation in asset mar-
kets illustrates this point. As Arthur (1995, p. 23) notes ’’[w]here forming expectations means
predicting an aggregate outcome that is formed in part from others’ expectations, expectation
formation can become self-referential. The problem of logically forming expectations then be-
comes ill-defined, and rational deduction finds itself with no bottom ground to stand upon’’.
Moreover, in economies with heterogenous investors the determination of an equilibrium might
turn out to be a complex (unsolvable) computational problem. Since the case-based decision the-
ory does not rely on the definition of states and state-contingent outcomes, it allows to address
2 See Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (2000, p.296) for a discussion of the problems connected with the construction
of states.
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these problems in a formal model.
Although the case-based decision theory has been applied in several economic contexts3, it has
not been used to model decision making in financial markets up to now. A model of financial
markets, in which expected utility maximization is replaced by case-based reasoning is of inter-
est for several reasons. First, it allows to gain a better understanding of the case-based decision
theory itself. Second, the application of the case-based decision theory to financial markets con-
tributes to the literature on behavioral finance, by describing the dynamics of portfolio holdings
and asset prices in a market with case-based investors. The analysis of the behavior implied by
case-based reasoning allows for comparisons to the predictions of the standard financial theory,
as well as to the empirical findings.
This paper presents a first attempt to apply the theory of case-based decisions to a model of
financial markets. First, a definition of a market equilibrium with case-based decision-makers
is provided and studied. The existence of an equilibrium is shown under quite general conditions.
Nevertheless, degenerate equilibria with 0 asset prices can emerge if the aspiration levels in the
economy are not sufficiently low.
However, conditions can be stated under which at least one non-degenerate equilibrium exists in
each period of time. In the sequel, such conditions are introduced to study the price dynamics in
an economy with case-based decision-makers. By considering an economy with heterogenous
consumers who differ in their aspiration levels, it is not only possible to analyze how the aspira-
tion level determines the behavior of a given investor, but also to explore the interaction between
investors with different aspiration levels and to indicate their influence on the asset price. The
relationship which is found between the aspiration level and the investment behavior in an in-
dividual portfolio choice problem, see Guerdjikova (2001) reappears in a market environment,
but the results also depend on the interaction of prices and portfolio choices in equilibrium.
In particular, it is found that investors with relatively low aspiration levels behave in a satisficing
manner, choosing constant, but possibly suboptimal portfolios over time. An economy popu-
lated by such investors, therefore, exhibits constant prices, which in general differ from prices
3 As for instance, in the consumer theory, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997, 2001), Gilboa and Pazgal (2001), the-
ory of voting, Aragones (1997), production theory, Jahnke, Chwolka and Simons (2001), social learning, Blonski
(1999), cooperation in games, Pazgal (1997), herding behavior, Krause (2003), choices among lotteries, Gayer
(2003).
3
under rational expectations. In contrast, investors with high aspiration levels constantly switch
between the portfolios available. Hence, they cause stochastic or deterministic cycles, exces-
sive price volatility and predictability of returns. Moreover, their behavior is suboptimal, since
they buy at high prices and sell at low prices, incurring losses. These findings are consistent
with empirical evidence from financial markets and demonstrate that the presence of case-based
decision-makers in a financial market may account for some of the phenomena inconsistent with
expected utility maximization combined with rational expectations.
The approach usually chosen in the literature to address these issues consists in studying the be-
havior of investors who satisfy the hypothesis of expected utility maximization but have biased
beliefs about the distribution of future returns. For instance, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrah-
manyam (1998) and Gervais and Odean (2001) provide an explanation of excessive trading fre-
quency by assuming that traders suffer from a self-attribution bias. De Long, Shleifer, Summers
and Waldmann (1990b), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Cutler, Poterba and Summers
(1990) assume that traders condition their behavior on past returns and induce positive correla-
tion of asset returns. De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990a), as well as Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) show how noise traders can generate arbitrage possibilities in a theoretical
model.
In contrast to this work, in this paper the framework of the expected utility theory is completely
abandoned and replaced by the framework of the case-based decision theory.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I introduce the model of the economy and derive
the individual demand for assets. In section 3, I define an equilibrium for the market populated
by case-based decision makers and prove existence under quite general conditions. Section 4
analyzes the evolution of the economy and determines the long-run distribution of the asset-
price, as well as the evolution of asset holdings for different groups of investors. In section 5,
it is discussed how empirically observed phenomena such as bubbles, predictability of returns,
excessive volatility and arbitrage possibilities can emerge in a market populated by case-based
decision makers. Section 6 concludes. The proofs of the results are stated in the appendix.
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2 The Economy
Consider an economy consisting of a continuum of investors uniformly distributed on the inter-
val [0;n]. For each i ∈ [0;n] and some constant u¯0 ∈ R denote by u¯i = u¯0 + i the aspiration
level of investor i. The continuum of investors can, therefore, be identified with the continuum
of aspiration levels [u¯0; u¯n].
Each investor lives for two periods. Investors derive utility only from consumption in the second
period of their life. The utility function u (·) is identical for all investors, strict monotonically
increasing and continuous. There is one consumption good in the economy. The initial endow-
ment of the investors consists of one unit of the consumption good in the first period and is 0 in
the second period of life.
The investors can transfer consumption between two periods by using a risky asset a and a
riskless asset b. The riskless asset delivers (1 + r) units of consumption per unit invested. It is
available in perfectly elastic supply at a price of 1.
The supply of a is fixed at A. Its payoff per unit is:
δt =

δD with probability q
0 with probability 1− q

,
identically and independently distributed in each period4. Denote the price of a at time t by pt.
2.1 Portfolio Choice Problem
The decision of a young investor in terms of the case-based decision theory is described as a
problem to be solved, by choosing an act out of a given set. In the present context the problem
can be formulated as: ’’Choose a portfolio of assets to enable consumption tomorrow’’.
I consider only the case in which there are only two portfolios possible for a single investor —
the whole initial endowment is invested either in a or in b. Short sales are prohibited5.
4 q is interpreted as the objective probability of high returns known to an external observer, but not to the investors
in the economy. Hence, q will be irrelevant for the investors’ decisions. However, the specification of q makes it
possible to analyze the long-run behavior of the economy.
5 The model can be easily generalized for the case of allowed diversification by introducing a similarity function
defined on problem - act / price - portfolio pairs. The results are robust in this respect as long as the similarity
function is strictly decreasing in the Euclidean distance between such points. Since the investors in the economy are
infinitesimally small, it is plausible that short sales are impossible for a single investor because of high transaction
costs and legal requirements. The restriction of short sales is also necessary to guarantee existence of an equilibrium.
5
Let αit ∈ {a; b} be the act chosen by a young investor with an aspiration level u¯i in period
t. Normalizing the price of the consumption good to 1 in each period, the indirect utility of
consumption of an old investor in period t becomes:
vt
 
αit−1

=
+
u

pt+δt
pt−1

, if αit−1 = a
u (1 + r), if αit−1 = b
I
.
In the spirit of the case-based decision theory, I assume that the decision-makers have almost no
information about the problem they are facing. They do not know the structure of the economy,
nor the process of price formation. They have no information about possible prices and returns of
the assets and their distribution. Hence, they can only learn from the experience of subjects, who
have lived before them. This experience is summarized in the memory which is represented by
a vector of cases. Each case consists of a past choice made and a utility realization consequently
observed:
(ατ−1; vτ (ατ−1)) .
Assume that thememory of a young investor i at time t consists only of the last case, experienced
by the investor from the current old generation with the same aspiration level6 i:
M it =
 
αit−1; vt
 
αit−1

The cumulative utility of an asset α ∈ {a; b} for investor i is, therefore:
U it (α) =

[vt (α)− u¯i], if αit−1 = α
0, else

.
According to the case-based decision theory, the investor chooses in each period the asset with
the highest cumulative utility.
2.2 Individual Demand for Assets
Consider a young investor i living in period t, whose direct predecessor holds a. His decision
is given by:
αit ∈
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
{a}, if u

pt+δt
pt−1

> u¯i
{a; b}, if u

pt+δt
pt−1

= u¯i
{b}, if u

pt+δt
pt−1

< u¯i
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
.
The continuity and strict monotonicity of u imply that in general there is a unique price p˜t (i)
6 One possibility to relax this assumption is by introducing social learning— the possibility to learn from investors
with different characteristics, see the works of Blonski (1999) and Krause (2003) on this issue.
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such that the demand of i for a, xit satisfies:
xit ∈
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0, if 0 ≤ pt < p˜t (i)q
1
p˜t(i)
; 0
r
, if pt = p˜t (i)
1
pt
, if pt > p˜t (i)
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
xit is plotted in figure 1.
?
?
pt
xt
p˜t(i)
1
p˜t(i)
Demand for a of a single investor i
.........................
..............
?
?
Figure 1
If , however,
u

δt
pt−1

− u¯i > 0, (1)
for the given realization of δt, then p˜t (i) ≥ 0 as defined above does not exist. In this case, xit is
given by:
xit =

1
pt
for all pt > 0
∞ for pt = 0

, (2)
see figure 2.
Now consider a young investor j, whose predecessor holds b. Since the comparison between
7
??
pt
xt
Demand for a of a single investor i with p˜t(i) < 0
Figure 2
u (1 + r) and u¯j does not reverse over time, the choice of this investor does not depend on pt
and is given by:
αit ∈
⎧
⎨
⎩
{a}, if u (1 + r) < u¯i
{a; b}, if u (1 + r) = u¯i
{b}, if u (1 + r) > u¯i
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
His demand for a is, therefore, constant in pt.
The arguments above show that the individual demand for the risky asset in general depends non-
monotonically on its current price. It increases for relatively low prices and decreases for high
prices. In the case illustrated in figure 1, the individual demand for the risky asset is insensitive
to price changes near 0. These characteristics of the individual demand determine the properties
of the aggregate value of demand for the risky asset, which is increasing in pt and can be 0 for
low prices.
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3 Temporary Equilibrium
Definition: A temporary equilibrium at time t is defined by:
• portfolio choices of the young investors αit ∈ {a; b} for each i ∈ [0;n];
• utility of consumption derived by the old investors vt
 
αit−1

for each i ∈ [0;n];
• a price of the asset a, pt
such that following conditions are fulfilled:
1. the young investors obey the case-based decision rule:
αit =

a, if U it (a) ≥ U it (b)
b, if U it (a) ≤ U it (b)

at the equilibrium price pt.
2. the old investors consume their whole income:
vt
 
αit−1

=
+
u

pt
pt−1
+ δt
pt−1

, if αit−1 = a
u (1 + r), if αit−1 = b
I
3. the market for the risky asset is cleared:
st =: Apt =
z
{i:αit=a}
di =: dt
Here, dt denotes the mass of the young investors, who choose to hold a in period t7 and
st is the value of supply of a.
Assume:
(A1) The utility function u (·) is strict monotonically increasing and continuous.
(A2) At t = 1 the population of the old investors can be partitioned into a finite number of intervals
such that all the investors of the same interval hold the same asset.
The following proposition insures the existence of an equilibrium in each period t ≥ 1.
Proposition 1 Assume that (A1) and (A2) hold. Then a temporary equilibrium of the economy
exists in every period t ≥ 1.
7 Or, in other words — the value of demand for a in period t.
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The equilibrium condition is illustrated in figure 3.
?
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??
??
??
? ?
?
pt
dtst
st = Apt
dt(pt)........................................................... ..........................................
n
n
A
Figure 3
The figure shows that the uniqueness of the equilibrium is not guaranteed. This is due to the fact
that the value of demand for the risky asset is an increasing function of the price. The argument
of the proof also shows that it is not possible to rule out equilibria in which the price of the risky
asset is equal to 0 and the demand for it is 0.
Nevertheless, as figure 4 illustrates, conditions which exclude equilibria with 0-prices can be
stated.
The condition, which excludes non-degenerate equilibria should insure that the value of demand
is strictly positive at pt = 0 for each t. Hence, the aspiration levels of the young investors with
memory (a; vt (a)) should be sufficiently low so that they choose αit = a even for pt = 0. Since
the lowest possible return of a is 0, this is only possible if u¯0 < 0 and a positive fraction of the
old investors with aspiration levels below 0 are endowed with a at t = 1.
It is, however, questionable whether the assumption u¯0 < 0 is economically meaningful. In
contrast, insuring that at least one equilibrium with non-zero price exists does not require such
10
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Figure 4
strong assumptions on the aspiration levels. Therefore, in the following section I state conditions
which insure that for all t ≥ 1, there is at least one equilibrium with pt > 0.
4 Price-Dynamics
After introducing the notion and guaranteeing the existence of a temporary equilibrium, I pro-
ceed to investigate the dynamics of asset prices and asset holdings in the economy. The main
factor determining the evolution of the economy is the distribution of aspiration levels.
I make the following assumptions which simplify the analysis:
(A3) Let the utility functions of the investors be linear, i.e.:
u

pt
pt−1
+
δt
pt−1

=
pt
pt−1
+
δt
pt−1
u (1 + r) = 1 + r.
(A4) Suppose that the initial holdings8 of the old consumers at time t = 1 be such that the investors
[0; u¯a − u¯0] hold the risky asset a, whereas those on the interval [u¯a − u¯0;n] hold the riskless
8 Since at t = 0 the memory of all investors is empty, the choice between the acts is based on chance.
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asset b for some u¯a ∈ (u¯0; 1).
(A5) Let A = 1 and assume that
p0 =
[u¯a − u¯0]
A
=

u¯a − u¯0

.
The assumption (A3) about the linearity of the utility function is not substantial: it allows for an
explicit computation of the equilibria, but does not influence the qualitative implications, as long
as the utility function is continuous and strictly increasing. (A4) specifies the initial holdings
in the economy. It insures that a positive mass of investors with relatively low aspiration levels
initially hold a, which is necessary for an equilibrium with pt > 0 to exist in each period of
time. An additional condition introduced below insures that the price of a remains positive
along the equilibrium path. (A5) specifies the price at t = 0 as the equilibrium price for the
initial allocation, specified in (A4).
Given these assumptions, three possible cases have to be distinguished, which will influence the
dynamics of the price pt qualitatively: either the highest aspiration level in the economy is lower
than (1 + r), or it lies in the interval between (1 + r) and the return of the risky asset, when it
brings positive dividends, or it is higher than the return of the risky asset when the dividends are
positive.
Denote by h and l the following states of the economy characterized by an asset allocation and
an equilibrium price:
αih = a, if u¯i ∈

u¯0; u¯a

∪ [(1 + r) ; u¯n]
αih = b, if u¯i ∈ [u¯a; (1 + r)]
ph =

u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0

αil = a, if u¯i ∈

u¯0; u¯a

αil = b, if u¯i ∈ [u¯a; u¯n]
pl =

u¯a − u¯0

.
Let s denote a typical equilibrium path characterizing the evolution of the economy. In the
following it is shown that only those paths on which the two states h and l occur will play a role
for the evolution of the economy. Hence, a typical equilibrium path s is (in general) a random
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sequence of h and l and can be written as
s = (st)
∞
t=0
with st ∈ {h; l}. Let S denote the set of all such paths and Σ denote the σ-algebra on S. Ct (h)
and Ct (l) describe the set of periods in which the economy is in state h and l, respectively (on
a path s, where this dependence is omitted in the notation for convenience). Denote by πh and
πl the limit frequencies of states h and l:
πh = lim
t→∞
|Ct (h)|
t
πl = lim
t→∞
|Ct (l)|
t
if these limits exist. Usually, these limits will depend on the path s as well. However, the
following proposition shows that for the economy at hand these frequencies are well defined
and independent of the chosen path s.
Proposition 2 Assume (A4), (A5) and (A6).
1. Suppose that
(1 + r) ≥ u¯n > 1 ≥ u¯a > u¯0. (3)
holds. Then l is a stationary state of the economy and πl = 1.
2. Suppose that
1 +
δD
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 > u¯
n > 1 + r > 1 > u¯a > u¯0. (4)
and
u¯a − u¯0
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 > u¯
a, (5)
hold. Then the Markov process with states h and l and transition matrix P¯ :
P¯ =
⎛
⎝
st+1 = h st+1 = l
st = h q 1− q
st = l 1 0
⎞
⎠
describes an equilibrium path of the economy. The limit frequencies πh and πl almost
surely coincide with the invariant probability distribution of P¯ and can be computed to be:
πh =
1
2− q
πl =
1− q
2− q .
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3. Suppose that
u¯n > 1 +
δD
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 > 1 + r > 1 > u¯
a > u¯0 (6)
and (5) hold. Then the deterministic cycle with two states h and l, such that st = h
for t = 2k + 1 st = l for t = 2k with k ∈ Z+0 is an equilibrium path of the economy.
πh = πl =
1
2
holds.
The specification of the aspiration levels is illustrated in figure 5 a)-c) for the three cases dis-
cussed in proposition 2. Part 1. of the proposition concerns the case of an economy with rela-
tively low aspirations. Since in this case all investors in the market are satisfied with their initial
holdings, the initial allocation is a stationary one.
???
(1 + r)u¯n
?
1u¯a ~} 
?? ? ?
u¯n
?
1u¯0 u¯a
?
(1 + r) 1 + Dph
?
? ? ? ?
u¯n1u¯a
?
(1 + r) 1 + Dph
?
u¯0
}  ~}  ~
 ~} 
}  ~}  ~
}  ~}  ~
a
a
 ~}  ~}  ~} 
b
 ~}  ~}  ~} 
b
u¯0
a
a a
a
a a
b
b
b
b
Stationary state l
Stochastic Cycle
Deterministic Cycle
a) Low aspiration levels
b) Intermediate aspiration levels
c) High aspiration levels
ph = [u¯
n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0]
Figure 5
In case 2., the highest aspiration level is chosen in such a way that some of the investors are
dissatisfied with the constant return of b and are also dissatisfied with the return of a as long as
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its dividend realization is low. Hence, these investors choose a as long as its dividend is positive,
switch to b, once the dividend realization becomes 0 and switch back to a in the next period,
thus causing the economy to evolve according to a stochastic cycle. Assumption (5) implies
that the investors with low aspiration levels, [u¯0; u¯a], are ready to hold the risky asset, even if
its dividend is 0 and its price falls by the highest possible amount9. This condition insures the
existence of an equilibrium path with pt > 0 in each t.
In case 3., the highest aspiration level is chosen so as to exceed any possible return realization.
Since this assumption renders some of the investors dissatisfied with any possible return realiza-
tion, these investors switch in each period between the available assets and cause a deterministic
cycle of the economy.
5 Discussion of the Results
The results derived in the previous section seem to be consistent with empirical results from
real and experimental financial markets which have detected significant violations of the ra-
tional expectations hypothesis in financial markets. First, in a market populated by case-based
decision-makers prices are not necessarily arbitrage-free:
Corollary 3 Under the assumptions of proposition 2, arbitrage possibilities are present in the
market if:
1. (3) holds and δD
u¯a−u¯0 < r. Then, asset b dominates asset a.
2. (4) and (5) hold and
[u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0]
u¯a − u¯0 > 1 + r.
Then, asset a dominates asset b in state l.
3. (5) and (6) hold and
[u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0]
u¯a − u¯0 > 1 + r.
Then, asset a dominates asset b in state l.
9 This happens if all investors with aspiration levels [(1 + r) ; u¯n] switch from a to b in a single period t. Then
pt−1 = u¯
n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0, whereas pt = u¯a − u¯0 obtain and the return of a becomes
u¯a − u¯0
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 .
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Violations of the no-arbitrage restrictions have been found in empirical data. The works of
Rosenthal and Young (1990), Lamont and Thaler (2001), Shleifer (2000, Chapter 3) document
arbitrage opportunities in real markets. It has been argued that these phenomena can be traced
back to short-sales limitations and other imperfections of real financial markets, see Cochrane
(2002). However, in an experiment in which a perfect market is simulated, Oliven and Rietz
(1995) and Rietz (1998) also record violations of arbitrage. They comment on the difficulties
they encounter to enforce arbitrage free prices, even after explaining the subjects how to identify
and use arbitrage opportunities.
The result derived for a market populated by case-based decision-makers shows that the notion
of arbitrage crucially depends on the knowledge of the investors about the economy. If the
investors do not know (or do not believe) that one asset is dominated by another one in each
state of nature, then no arbitrage possibilities exist for them in the market, although they might
be present from the viewpoint of an external observer.
Bubbles and significant deviations of the prices from fundamental values are often observed in
financial markets, see Kindelberger (1978), Sunder (1995) and Camerer (1989). In a market
populated by case-based decision-makers, the price of the risky asset need not coincide with the
fundamental value, even if the investors have a linear utility function and a riskless asset exists:
Corollary 4 Denote by FV the fundamental value of a:
FV =
qδD
r
and let µa denote the mean price of a. Under the assumption of proposition 2:
1. if (3) holds, µa ? FV , iff u¯a − u¯0 ? qδDr ;
2. if (4) and (5) hold, µa ? FV , iff10
D ? r (2− q) (u¯
a − u¯0) + r (u¯n − (1 + r))
(2− q) qδ ;
10
D∗δ > (u¯n − 1)
 
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0

,
as required in condition (4) holds, for instance, if
r > (2− q) q (u¯n − 1) .
If
D∗δ < (u¯n − 1)
 
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0

,
thenD > D∗ always holds and the risky asset is undervalued, µa < FV .
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3. if (5) and (6) hold, µa ? FV , iff
qδD
r
? 1
2
[u¯n − (1 + r)] +

u¯a − u¯0

.
Moreover, when investors with aspiration levels exceeding (1 + r) are present in the market, we
observe price upward movements, which do not depend on the dividend paid by a. Hence, they
cannot be attributed either to changes in fundamentals, or to changes in the dividends. As long
as (4) holds, the downward movements are in contrast conditioned on the asset paying a low
dividend in the second period. As a whole, the structure of the asset-price movements reminds
of a small bubble, which emerges without visible reasons (apart from the fact that a large part
of the investors is dissatisfied by the returns of the safe technology) and then bursts, because of
low dividend payments. Of course, if the asset continues to pay high dividends, then the high
price of the asset will persist, until in some period t the dividend becomes low. As long as the
probability 1− q of a low dividend is positive, the bubble will burst with probability one.
For case 3. of proposition 2, the bubbles become deterministic, since the downward movement
also occurs independently of the dividend paid.
Corollary 5 Under the assumption of proposition 2,
1. if (3) holds, then the standard deviation of the price σa satisfies σa = 0;
2. if (4) and (5) hold,
σa =
s
1− q [u¯
n − (1 + r)]
(2− q) ;
3. if (6) and (5) hold,
σa =
1
2
[u¯n − (1 + r)] .
In cases 2. and 3. when investors have relatively high aspiration levels, the fluctuation of the
price is neither due to changes in the fundamental value of the asset, nor to new information nor
even necessarily to changes in the dividend payments. Hence, the asset price exhibits extreme
volatility, which cannot be explained by the characteristics of the asset, but which is consistent
with the empirical evidence on price volatility, see Roll (1984, 1989) and Shiller (1981, 1990).
The price fluctuation in the model can be explained by the decision-making process of the in-
vestors. The risk, faced by the investors in the market consists of two parts: the random fluctu-
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ation of the dividends described by q and the ignorance of the investors and their reliance on the
cumulative utility when predicting returns. Especially, the volatility depends positively on the
mass of investors with high aspiration levels [u¯n − (1 + r)]. In Guerdjikova (2001), it has been
shown that investors with relatively high aspiration levels usually trade too much in the sense
of Odean (1999). The results derived here demonstrate that in a market environment increasing
the number of case-based decision-makers with high aspiration levels leads to an increase of the
risk faced by the economy, as well as to frequent change of asset holdings. By switching too of-
ten between the available portfolios, not acting on information, these investors not only cause
the price of the risky asset to fluctuate without changes of the fundamental value but also lower
their profits, since they buy when prices are high and sell at low prices11.
The behavior of investors with relatively high aspiration levels furthermore renders the price
movements in the model predictable. Observe that if (4) and (5) hold, the upward price move-
ments are predictable, whereas if conditions (6) and (5) hold, both the upwards and the down-
wards price movements are predictable to some extent. Predictability of asset returns has been
recorded in financial markets by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter
(1992), Bernard (1992), Bernard and Thomas (1989,1990), Loughran and Ritter (1995). Signif-
icant violations of the efficiency market hypothesis are found. Factors like past performance,
market-to-book ratios and capitalizations of stocks, as well as seasonality can help predict future
returns. Especially, negative short-run correlation of price movements for individual assets has
been observed by Blume and Friend (1978), Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Jegadeesh (1990).
A similar result obtains in the present model. Assume that the aspiration levels of the investors
remain constant, but the dividend paid by the asset increases12. It is easy to see that the correlation
between the returns of the asset a is small if the aspiration levels are relatively low as compared to
δD (the capitalization of the firm is large)13 and rises, as the capitalization diminishes, rendering
the aspiration levels of the investor relatively high as compared to δD.
11 Excessive frequency of trades which cannot be justified by changes in fundamentals or by profitability consid-
erations is recorded by Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2001 a, 2001 b).
12 The value of the dividend δD can be used as a proxy for the capitalization of the firm —D.
13 In the case of low aspiration levels (δD is relatively high) there is no correlation between the returns. As
δD decreases (the case of intermediate aspiration levels) the correlation increases (downward price movements
are certainly followed by upward price movements), whereas in the case of high aspiration levels, upward and
downward price movements alternate in each period.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, I define a market equilibrium for an economy populated by case-based decision-
makers and study the asset price dynamics. The dynamic of asset prices and asset holdings is
determined by the position of the highest aspiration level relative to the highest possible return
of the risky asset. If the aspiration levels in the economy are relatively low, the price of the risky
asset and the holdings of the investors remain constant over the time. Nevertheless, the price of
the asset might deviate significantly from its fundamental value and arbitrage possibilities may
be present in the market.
Higher aspiration levels induce cycles, which may be stochastic or deterministic. The risky asset
exhibits excess volatility, which depends positively on the mass of investors with high aspiration
levels in the economy. These investors trade too much, lowering their own profits and increas-
ing the variance of prices. Hence, they exhibit the characteristic behavior of ’’overconfident’’
investors, whose presence in the market was documented by Odean (1998). Since case-based
investors base their decisions on past information, price movements are forecastable to some
extent and exhibit negative correlation in the short-run. Hence, in a market populated by case-
based investors, it is possible to identify phenomena which are inconsistent with expected utility
maximization combined with rational expectations, but which might help to explain empirical
findings from financial markets.
Although the assumptions made to derive the results might seem too severe, they can be easily
relaxed and the results generalized accordingly. Allowing for diversification necessitates the
introduction of a similarity function among price - portfolio pairs14. If the similarity is defined
as a strictly decreasing function of the Euclidean distance between such pairs, the limit results
derived in this paper remain unchanged.
Introducing long memory allows for learning, but only for investors whose aspiration levels are
appropriately chosen. Even if all past cases are included in the memory, the investors might not
be able to learn the optimal portfolio if their aspiration levels are too high or extremely low.
A major criticism of the model presented in this paper is that the economy consists only of case-
14 See Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997) for an axiomatzation of the case-based decision theory, in which similarity
perceptions among problem - act pairs are present. The introduction of similarity becomes necessary, if the number
of available acts is infinite.
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based investors and that their initial endowment does not change over the time and is, therefore,
independent of their previous returns, given the OLG structure of the model. To address these
issues a model of an economy with both case-based decision makers and expected utility maxi-
mizers should be considered. Should it be found that the share of wealth the case-based decision
makers own shrinks to 0, as the time evolves, their influence on prices and returns would be-
come negligible, prices and returns would behave as under rational expectations. The claim that
the presence of case-based decision-makers can explain empirically observed phenomena such
as bubbles, predictability of returns or arbitrage possibilities would then be unfounded. How-
ever, in Guerdjikova (2004) it is shown that the case-based decision-makers are not necessarily
driven out of the market and that their behavior may have a significant influence on prices.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: It is first stated that the value of demand for a of those intervals of
investors, who remember a case of the type (b;u (1 + r)) at time t is a constant function of the
price pt:
Lemma 6 Consider an interval of investors with aspiration levels [u¯m; u¯p] ⊂ [u¯0; u¯n] with
identical memories. Let αit−1 = b. Then
• if

u (1 + r)− u¯i

< 0 for each u¯i ∈ [u¯m; u¯p] , (7)
then αit = a for every i ∈ [u¯m − u¯0; u¯p − u¯0].
Proposition 7 • if

u (1 + r)− u¯i

< 0 for each u¯i ∈ [u¯m; u¯p] , (8)
then αit = b for every i ∈ [u¯m − u¯0; u¯p − u¯0].
• if neither (7), nor (8) are satisfied, then there is a critical aspiration level uˆ ∈ (u¯m; u¯p), such
that:
uˆ = u (1 + r)
and
αit = a, if u¯i ≥ uˆ
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αit = b, if u¯i ≤ uˆ.
Proof of Lemma 6:
Follows directly from the argument in section 2.2.?
Figure 6 illustrates the three cases.
?
?
?
?
?
?
pt pt pt
dt dt
u¯p − u¯m
uˆ− u¯m
dt
Figure 6
The following corollary characterizes the value of demand of these investors:
Corollary 8 Consider an interval of investors with aspiration levels [u¯m; u¯p] ⊂ [u¯0; u¯n] with
identical memories. Let αit−1 = b for all u¯i ∈ [u¯m; u¯p]. Then the value of demand for a of the
interval [u¯m; u¯p] — dAt [u¯m; u¯p] is a constant function of pt and can obtain (depending on the
memory and the aspiration levels [u¯m; u¯p]) only values between 0 and (u¯p − u¯m).
Now consider the investors whose predecessors hold a.
Proposition 9 Consider an interval of investors with aspiration levels

u¯j; u¯l

⊂ [u¯0; u¯n] with
identical memories, containing the case (a; vt (a)). Define pˆt by:
pˆt = min

pt ∈ R+0 | u

pt + δt
pt−1

− u¯i ≥ 0
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for every u¯i ∈

u¯j; u¯l

and pˇt by:
pˇt = max

pt ∈ R+0 | u

pt + δt
pt−1

− u¯i ≤ 0

,
for every u¯i ∈

u¯j; u¯l

if a maximum exists and set pˇt = 0, else. Then the individual choices of
the young investors in this interval are given by:
• if pt ≤ pˇt, then αit = b for all u¯i ∈

u¯j; u¯l

;
• if pt ≥ pˆt, then αit = a for all u¯i ∈

u¯j; u¯l

;
• if pˆt > 0 and pt ∈ [pˇt; pˆt], then there exists a critical aspiration level u¯∗ ∈
 
u¯j; u¯l

, such
that
u¯∗ = u

pt + δt
pt−1

(9)
and
αit = b, if u¯i ≥ u¯∗
αit = a, if u¯i ≤ u¯∗.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Write the cumulative utility of a is given by:
U it (a) = u

pt + δt
pt−1

− u¯i, (10)
whereas
U it (b) = 0.
pˆt, as defined in the proposition, then denotes the lowest possible price of a, for which the
cumulative utility of a exceeds the cumulative utility of b for all investors with aspiration levels

u¯j; u¯l

, whereas pˇt is the highest possible price, for which the inverse relation holds. The
continuity and the strict monotonicity of the utility function with respect to pt insures that pˆt and
pˇt are well defined and unique. The three cases listed in the proposition emerge naturally, when
comparing the cumulative utilities of a and b. The definition of pˆt and pˇt implies immediately
that if pt ≥ pˆt, then act a is preferred by all investors with aspiration levels

u¯j; u¯l

, whereas
pt ≥ pˇt implies that everyone chooses b. If pt ∈ [pˇt; pˆt], some of the investors will choose a and
some b. The critical aspiration level u¯∗ (which of course depends on the price pt) is determined
by setting the two cumulative utilities equal and solving for u¯i. (A1) insures that u¯∗ is continuous
and increasing in pt. Therefore, the result of the proposition obtains.?
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The following corollary obtains:
Corollary 10 Consider an interval of investors with aspiration levels

u¯j; u¯l

⊂ [u¯0; u¯n] with
identical memories. Let αit−1 = a for all u¯i ∈

u¯j; u¯l

. The value of demand for a (or the
mass of investors, who wish to hold k) of this interval — dt
 
u¯j; u¯l

is a monotone increasing,
continuous function of the price pt. The function consists of at most three segments:
• for pt > pˆt
dt
 
u¯j; u¯l

= u¯l − u¯j = const,
• for pt < pˇt
dt
 
u¯j; u¯l

= 0 = const,
• for pt ∈ [pˇt; pˆt] dt
 
u¯j; u¯l

is strongly increasing in pt and convex, concave or linear if
u (·) is convex, concave or linear, respectively. dt
 
u¯j; u¯l

is bounded above15 by

u¯l − u¯j

and below by 0.
The result of the corollary is illustrated in figure 7 for a concave utility function u (·):
?
?pt
dt
 
u¯j; u¯l

pˆtpˇt
.....................................u¯l − u¯j
Figure 7
15 The upper boundary results from the budget constraint of each investor.
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Corollaries 8 and 10 demonstrate that each interval of investors with identical memories and
choices at time (t− 1) is divided into at most two intervals such that all investors in the same
interval have identical memories and make identical choices at time t. Hence, if (A2) is satisfied
in period t = 1, then it is also satisfied in each period of time thereafter.
Corollaries 8 and 10 further demonstrate that the value of demand for a of each interval of in-
vestors with identical memories is a continuous function of pt. The aggregate value of demand
(obtained as the sum of the interval-values of demand) has therefore the same properties. More-
over, it maps the interval of possible prices

0; n
A

into the interval of possible values of demand
[0;n] and therefore, according to the fixed-point theorem of Brouwer, see Mas-Collel, Whinston
and Green (1995, p. 952), the aggregate value of demand has a fixed point. Such a fixed-point
satisfies:
dt (pt) = Apt = st (pt) ,
or for pt 9= 0,
dt (pt)
pt
= xt (pt) = A,
which is the market-clearing condition for the risky asset.
For pt = 0, the value of demand equals the value of supply and the demand for the asset is 0,
whereas the supply is positive, hence the fixed-point again represents a market equilibrium.?
Proof of Proposition 2:
1. (3) implies that, for investors with u¯i ∈ [u¯a; u¯n] and αi0 = b the cumulative utilities satisfy:
U i1 (b) = 1 + r − u¯i > 0 = U i1 (a) .
Hence, αi1 = b for i ∈ [u¯a − u¯0; u¯n − u¯0]. By induction, suppose that the investors with u¯i ∈
[u¯a; u¯n] choose b in some period t and consider the decision of the young investors in period
(t+ 1). Since
U it+1 (b) = 1 + r − u¯i > 0 = U it+1 (a)
for all u¯i ∈ [u¯a; u¯n], it follows thatαit = b obtains in each period of time for i ∈ [u¯a − u¯0; u¯n − u¯0].
Now consider the investors with u¯i ∈ [u¯0; u¯a] and αi0 = a. In t = 1, the cumulative utilities
they observe satisfy:
U i1 (a) = 1 +
δt
u¯a − u¯0 − u¯
i ≥ 1− u¯i > 0 = U i1 (b) ,
as long as p1 = u¯a − u¯0, hence as long as αi1 = a for i ∈ [0; u¯a − u¯0]. By induction, U it (a) >
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U it (b) holds for each t ≥ 1 if αit = a for all i ∈ [0; u¯a − u¯0]. Hence, in each t ≥ 1, there is a
temporary equilibrium in which st = l. Therefore, l is a stationary state of the economy.
2. Now assume (4) and (5). Suppose that at some t− 1 the state of the economy is l.
In period t, the investors with aspiration levels u¯i ∈ [u¯a; (1 + r)] observe cumulative utilities:
U it (b) = 1 + r − u¯i > 0 = U it (a)
and choose αit = b. The investors with aspiration levels u¯i ∈ [(1 + r) ; u¯n] observe cumulative
utilities:
U it (b) = 1 + r − u¯i < 0 = U it (a)
and choose αit = a, regardless of the price pt. Since their mass is [u¯n − (1 + r)], as long as the
investors with aspiration levels u¯i ∈ [u¯0; u¯a] choose αit = a, the cumulative utilities observed
by these investors are
Ut (a) =
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 + δt
u¯a − u¯0 − u¯
i > 1− u¯i > 0 = U it (b) ,
by assumption (4). Hence, the investor on the interval [0; u¯a − u¯0] indeed choose αit = a in
equilibrium. Hence, in t, state h is an equilibrium.
Nowconsider a period t−1 inwhich the state of the economy ish. Two casesmust be considered:
• δt = δD
The young investors with aspiration levels [u¯a; (1 + r)] observe cumulative utilities:
U it (b) = 1 + r − u¯i > 0 = U it (a)
and chooseαit = b. As long as the investors with aspiration levels u¯i ∈ [u¯0; u¯a]∪[(1 + r) ; u¯n]
choose αit = a, they observe cumulative utilities:
U it (a) = 1 +
δD
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 − u¯
i > 0 > U it (b) ,
by assumption (4). Hence, it is indeed optimal for them to choose a. It follows that in period
t with δt = δD, st = h is an equilibrium.
• δt = 0
The young investors with aspiration levels [u¯a; (1 + r)] observe cumulative utilities:
U it (b) = 1 + r − u¯i > 0 = U it (a)
and choose αit = b.
Even if all of the young consumers with aspiration levels [u¯0; u¯a] ∪ [(1 + r) ; u¯n] choose a,
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the cumulative utilities they observe are given by:
U it (a) = 1− u¯i
U it (b) = 0.
Whereas U it (a) > U it (b) holds for all i ∈ [0; u¯a − u¯0], it is obviously violated for i ∈
[(1 + r)− u¯0;n], because of condition (4). Hence, αit = b for all i ∈ [(1 + r)− u¯0;n]. The
cumulative utilities observed by the investors i ∈ [0; u¯a − u¯0] then become:
U it (a) =
u¯a − u¯0
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 − u¯
i > 0 = U it (b) ,
according to assumption (5) and these investors choose αit = a. Hence, in period t with
δt = 0, the economy returns to state l.
Since the economy starts in state l by assumptions (A4) and (A5), it follows that if in period
t the economy is in state l, the state in (t+ 1) is h with probability 1. If in period t the state
is h, then in (t+ 1) the economy moves to state l if the dividend realization is 0, hence, with
probability (1− q) and stays in state h if the dividend realization is δD, or with probability q.
It follows that the economy evolves according to a Markov process with two states h and l and
a transition matrix:
P¯ =
⎛
⎝
pt+1 = ph pt+1 = pl
pt = ph q 1− q
pt = pl 1 0
⎞
⎠ .
Now compute the invariant probability distribution of the Markov chain described by P¯ :
πh
πl

=

πh
πl

P¯ ,
which simplifies to
qπh = (2− πh) .
It follows that the invariant probabilities satisfy:
πh =
1
2− q
πl =
1− q
2− q .
These probabilities are obviously strictly positive for q ∈ (0; 1) and therefore the Markov chain
described by P¯ is positive recurrent. Since any positive recurrent chain on a countable space is
also positive Harris recurrent, see Meyn and Tweedie (1996, p. 208), it follows that the Law of
Large Numbers applies for this chain. Hence, let ιh denote the indicator function for state h:
ιh (t) =

1, if st = h
0, if st = l

.
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According to theorem 17.1.7 in Meyn and Tweedie (1996, p. 425),
lim
t→∞
1
t
t[
τ=0
ιh (t) =
z
ιh (t) dπ = πh
holds almost surely for any initial distribution over the states h and l. Since 1
t
pt
τ=0 ιh (t) de-
scribes the mean time up to period t that the economy spends in state h, it follows that the
frequency of state h equals πh almost surely in the limit. Analogous arguments show that the
frequency of state l equals πl on almost each path s ∈ S.
3. Assume now that (6) and (5) hold. Let the state of the economy be l at some time t−1. Then, as
shown in part 2. of this proof, the equilibrium of the economy is state h at time t. If the state of
the economy is h at t−1 and the dividend payment is 0, then the arguments used in part 2. of this
proof demonstrate that the state of the economy is l at time t. Assume, therefore, that st−1 = h
and δt = δD. The proof would be completed if it were shown that st = l is an equilibrium.
At t, the young investors with aspiration levels [u¯a; (1 + r)] observe cumulative utilities:
U it (b) = 1 + r − u¯i > 0 = U it (a)
and choose αit = b.
Even if all of the young consumers with aspiration levels [u¯0; u¯a] ∪ [(1 + r) ; u¯n] choose a, the
cumulative utilities they observe are given by:
Ut (a) = 1 +
δD
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 − u¯
i.
Since
1 +
δD
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 − u¯
n < 0,
it follows that there is a subinterval of investors with aspiration levels between [(1 + r) ; u¯n] for
whom
U it (a) < U
i
t (b)
holds and who, therefore, choose αit = b.
I will show that if (5) holds, there is an equilibrium, in which all investors with aspiration
levels [(1 + r) ; u¯n] choose αit = b. Indeed, suppose to the contrary that if all investors from
[(1 + r)− u¯0;n] choose αit = b, for some of them
U it (a) =
u¯a − u¯0 + δD
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 − u¯
i > 0 = U it (b)
27
holds. This implies that
u¯a − u¯0 + δD
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 − (1 + r) > 0,
since (1 + r) is the lowest aspiration level in this interval. Hence,
δD
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 > (1 + r)−
u¯a − u¯0
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 . (11)
On the other hand, the first inequality of condition (6) implies that
δD
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 < u¯
n − 1, (12)
whereas condition (5) requires
u¯a − u¯0 > u¯a
 
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0

and since u¯a − u¯0 < u¯a, this means that
 
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0

< 1,
or
2 + r − u¯n − u¯a + u¯0 > 0
must hold.
Now compare the left hand sides of (11) and (12). It is easy to see that since
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 > 0,
(1 + r)− u¯
a − u¯0
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 > u¯
n − 1
is equivalent to
[u¯n − (1 + r)]

2 + r − u¯n − u¯a + u¯0

> 0,
which is always satisfied, as long as (6) and (5) hold. Hence, δD cannot satisfy (11) and (12)
simultaneously and, therefore,
u¯a − u¯0 + δD
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 < (1 + r)
obtains. But then
U it (a) =
u¯a − u¯0 + δD
u¯n − (1 + r) + u¯a − u¯0 − u¯
i < 0 = U it (b)
holds for all u¯i ∈ [(1 + r) ; u¯n]. Hence, state l is indeed an equilibrium at time t. It follows that
st = l implies st+1 = h and st = h implies st+1 = l.
Since the economy starts at state l, it follows that the two states h and l indeed define a deter-
ministic cycle of the economy as described in the proposition.?
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